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Abstract: Actual crisis which originated from USA quickly spread throughout the world 
economy. Although at the beginning it was labeled as exclusively financial one, after its 
second wave (in 2008) everything became much clear. Finally we all became aware of its 
overwhelming influence on both financial and real spheres of national economies as well 
as global economic system. Being interested in what is obvious at the moment, in the first 
part of this paper we are going to describe (as much concisely as it’s possible) reaction of 
economists  to  its  emerging  and  further  developing,  focusing  primary  on  short-term 
measures and policy responses to crisis. Second part of the paper is devoted to more 
fundamental questions of economic science: Was this crisis predictable? Which type of 
crisis it represents? Is the crisis itself capable of jeopardizing mainstream dominance? 
Key words: economic crisis, economic theory 
JEL codes: F4; G17 
1. INSTEAD OF ORDINARY INTRODUCTION 
Like  many times  before, world economy  happened to be  somehow caught  in a trap by 
events that represented first symptoms of global crisis. So, it took for a while that economists 
recognize crisis’ potential. According to recent reports (UNCTAD, 2008), world economy notes 
a fall in growth of output since second half of 2007. In 2007 that rate was 3.8%, last year it was 
2.5%, and prognosis say that for this year (even for those who are optimistic) more than 1.6% 
can not be expected. Judging by measures for easing and overcoming of the crisis, it seems to 
have the following key characteristics: first, the crisis has spread throughout financial, as well as 
the real sector (slowing down of industrial production, export and GDP), so it is impossible to be 
overcome without state intervention; second, taking into consideration its actual and potential 
consequences, the crisis will demand deeper, fundamental, structural changes; third, according to 
the prognosis and expectations, it will be most troubling for those economies that experienced 
excessive indebtedness and constantly present budget deficit. 
2. WHAT TYPE OF CRISIS WE ARE FACING WITH? 
In order to see implications of economic as well as political aspects of global crisis, it is 
necessary to answer the question concerning the kind of the crisis. Generally, there are three 
types of crisis (D Arcy, 2008). First, and least dangerous, is crisis caused by interaction of bad 
events such as external shocks (for example increase of prices in a world market) and imbalances 
on the level of national economies (when spending falls behind production). This leads to the 
decline of GDP and rise of unemployment. Strategy for a fight against such kind of crisis is 
different for each country: although expansive fiscal policy has been more often chosen, there is  Slavica Manic 
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also a possibility to decide on so-called „not doing anything“, when an economy is left to the 
„mercy” of the market mechanism. 
Far more serious is the structural crisis in which a certain way of organizing production 
becomes out of date; in this situation fundamentally economic changes are necessary in order to 
return the economy to development path. Like it was in the period of Great Depression (1929-
1933) when the concept of Keynesian restructuring has enabled going through structural crisis, 
and in period of stagflation (in the 1970’s) when neo-liberal ideas did the same thing. 
The biggest threat is represented by so-called systemic crisis in which an economy is facing with 
problems that have no solutions inside of an existing production system. 
Current crisis is far from „ordinary“ crisis of the first type; having in mind the warnings 
from  economists  that  the  modern  capitalism  (which  is  built  on  a  foundation  of  stimulating 
private spending) has become structurally unstable (Stanford, 2008), it seems that this kind of 
diagnostics implicate that we are dealing with a structural crisis. Will it grow to systemic one, 
depends strictly on inner options the system has at the disposal “for restructuring itself to restore 
profitability and growth” (D’Arcy, 2008). 
In  response  to  current  financial  crisis,  developed  countries  started  to  apply  bundle  of 
measures focused on securing the liquidity. Besides, programmes supporting banks as well as 
other  financial  institutions  have  instantly  been  initiated.  These  are  extremely  complicated 
measures,  and  every  country  is  free  to  choose the  combination  of  measures  appropriate  for 
conditions it is facing with. Even though they can postpone or prevent the collapse of financial 
system, those measures give a small hope for achieving long-term, real recovery. 
Given that this crisis has shown the limits of existing regulatory and supervision frameworks on 
national and world level, new rules and institutions (which would be directed to reducing of the 
systemic risk) are also necessary. This  means that, apart from  measures  meant for resolving 
insolvency  problems  of  financial  institutions,  some  additional,  reform  steps  should  be 
undertaken. In that sense, one of the most important tasks is re-regulation of financial markets 
(Stiglitz, 2009) which at least partially will contribute to general economic stability. However, it 
will not be enough if fiscal part “of the story” is further neglected. Besides, nobody for sure can 
predict what consequences may produce this “concentration of financial capital via completing 
the integration of commercial and investment banking” (Panitch and Gindin, 2008).
1 
3. HOW THE CRISIS MAY AFFECT AN ECONOMY (CASE OF SERBIA)? 
What was Serbia’s reaction to the announcement of economic crisis? Obviously, it did not 
represent one exception from the rule – unexpectedly and with surprise it accepted the news 
about  economic  “quakes”  around  the  world.  The  fact  that  the  degree  of  our  integration  in 
European and international economic flows is still on unenviable level is treated as quite justified 
reason for not becoming worried. We were constantly persuaded by government representatives 
that, owing to the above-mentioned fact, Serbia has some sort of „protective belt“, so the crisis 
will pass right by us. Even if we assume that this kind of reactions were made in order not to 
cause a mass panic,
2 there may be another (and more appropriate) explanation: “local” economic 
analysts  seem  not to be well  “equipped” (no  matter whether theoretically or practically)  for 
dealing with such problem. 
Second, in conditions of global crisis, economic policy in Serbia is not exposed only to 
usual difficulties – continuation of market reforms, restructuring of economy, and attempts in 
achieving macroeconomic stability. It is well known how high of a price transitional economies 
                                                 
1 They warn that such solution for “bridging” the insolvencies of investment bankers is quite the opposite to the 
solution offered during the crisis of 1930’s.  
2 Cycles can be treated as a kind of epidemic, which is characterized by either optimistic or pessimistic expectations. Economic crisis, its prospects and challenges for economic theory 
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have  already  paid  in  the  form  of  transformational  recession  (while  transferring  from  one 
institutional  arrangement  to  another).  Reduction  of  global  economic  activity,  rapid  fall  of 
investments,  bankruptcy  of  firms  around  the  world  etc.,  can  not  pass  by  Serbia:  quite  the 
contrary – it is evident and certain that the world economic crisis will sharpen existing problems 
and create new ones. 
And that is just one more pressure point which will question measures designed and proposed 
with the aim to soften (minimize) the consequences of crisis. For less developed countries like 
Serbia, following things are very important: foreign financing will be more difficult and much 
more  expensive  then  so  far;
3  exporting  of  goods  and  services  will  be  sluggish  because  of 
contraction of world economy growth. 
If we look at the “channels” that the world financial crisis is being transferred through, the 
banking sector seems to be protected from negative “overspills” (it was not involved in trading 
with risky securities, nor have the banks been exposed to contaminated sub-prime credits). Since 
the growth of Serbia’s key exporting markets is reducing, even with the share of export in GDP 
being relatively low (around 30%), this decreasing demand will certainly have an unfavourable 
influence on our economic activities. 
The thing that is the most problematic for our economy is the fact that global contraction of 
credit activity is causing a standstill of capital inflows (loans and foreign investments), which 
will consequently lead to slowing down of growth rate.
4 From October 2008 to January 2009 
industrial production was reduced for almost 25%, whereas the export fell on the half of previous 
level.
5 These are obvious and significant signs of crisis, which can not be neglected any longer. 
Besides, the EU is also affected by current crisis.
6 Keeping in mind that (with the exception of 
countries from Western Balkan) member states of the EU are at the same time most important 
trade partners and main investors for Serbia, through these two “channels” further deepening of 
crisis is more than a certain. 
4. HOW THE CRISIS MAY AFFECT ECONOMIC THEORY?  
Every  crisis  encroaches  on  relations  and  structure  of  current  order.  The  word  crisis  is 
implying that the breaking point (possibly a turning point or a major change) is about to appear 
in  the  development  of  certain  event.  In  medicine  a  crisis  is  “questioning”  the  capability  of 
organism to return to the state of normal functioning (with appropriate therapy). Metaphorically 
speaking, this can be applied to the example of any economy: above all, economic crisis is about 
good diagnostics of the problem, as well as testing of potential of one economy to “heal” itself, 
and challenging the experts in that area. 
In the context of actual economic crisis the thesis that it simultaneously represents the signal 
for  existence  of  crisis  in  economic  theory  and/or  economic  science  in  general  has  been 
revitalized. That is why the question of responsibility of economic science for that crisis is also 
more  often  mentioned.  In  that  sense  few  different  interpretations  of  responsibility  can  be 
distinguished.  
Some  consider  that  the  dominant  paradigm  (neoclassical  orthodoxy)  as  a  starting  point  of 
economic  policy  should  be  blamed  for  existing  crisis.  Others  are  more  inclined  to  idea  of 
                                                 
3 Due to high risk-premium, financing of Eastern Europe is now the most expencive at the global market.  (Global 
Financial Stability Report, 2008, p. 44). 
4  About  consequences  caused  by  capital  inflows  and  outflows,  i.e.  about  their  influence  on  macroeconomic 
variables, see: Reinhart and Reinhart (2008). 
5 Even though it may look like an unpleasant incident in august last year, after few months it turned out to be a 
decreasing tendency after three years of stable growth. 
6 Some important data concerning budget deficit, unemployment rate, national debt and economic contraction for 
every member of the EU were published on February 2009 at: http://www.nrc.nl/  Slavica Manic 
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“dispersion of guilty” on economic science in general, since its predictability failed once again 
(in other words, it didn’t manage to foresee the coming crisis). The third group of opinions claim 
that  the  responsibility  of  economic  science  can  be  checked  indirectly  –  through  testing  the 
efficiency of proposed/applied measures meant for overcoming the crisis. Having in mind that 
economists have always been better in explaining the past than predicting the future, economic 
science seems to be (as usual) able to analyse the crisis and draw some conclusions from it. 
It is true that proper conclusions can be valuable starting point in case of future crisis. But, 
what economists always forget is the following (and very important) fact: every new crisis is 
outstanding one; that is why economic science will certainly find itself “stunned” once again.
7 
Economic history has registered existence of economic crisis a long time ago, although they 
started to repeat periodically (on somehow recognizable way) during liberal capitalism (since 
then  they  have  been  known  as  crisis  of  hyper  production).  With  the  exception  of  Great 
Depression (dated from 1929 to1933), the first half of the last century was characterized by 
“distorted”  rhythm  of  crisis.  That  led  to  belief  that  capitalistic  system,  thanks  to  Keynes’ 
measures of economic policy, finally got rid of any crisis (since that crisis suffered ultimate 
defeat).  At the  time  Keynes  was  declared  as  the  „saviour  of  capitalism“,  and  the  economic 
science was proud of achieved consensus (personified in the sentence “we are all Keynesians“). 
In 1973 the energetic crisis, caused by “oil shock” was actually the first meaningful economic 
crisis after the Second World War. Since then, the Keynesian theory looses its impact, and its 
position was taken over by monetarist (neo-liberal) conception (Heilbroner and Milberg, 1997). 
Great opponents of state intervention (like Friedman) suggest measures of deregulation and re-
privatization in the function of revitalizing economies. And actually, the mentioned measures 
have  been  successful  in  solving  the  stagflation  as  the  most  troubling  problem  of  that  time. 
However,  exactly  due  to  deregulation,  it  has  been  generated  financial  crisis  in  USA  (in  the 
middle of 2007), which then spread throughout the world.  
Innovativeness  of  neo-liberalism  has  culminated  in  creating  so-called  “shadow  banking 
system” (Gupta, 2008). Since it has contained a lot of non-transparent, complicated instruments, 
involving different processes or aspects, it was difficult to be understood, let alone to be dealt 
with. That’s why it evaded existing regulations with ease. On top of everything, the Federal 
Reserve did not make any constructive effort to prevent worsening of the situation. Therefore, by 
not interrupting illegal chain of activities, it was actually acting as an accomplice to the biggest 
financial crime in new history. 
Officially, every country has taken drastic economic measures designed to lift the economy 
out of recession. As it was expected, they began on side of monetary policy – by pumping cash 
into the banking sector (Stanford, 2008). This was quite the opposite from Keynes’ ideas.
8 What 
did they need? Speaking about the above-mentioned, re-regulation could be helpful – to prevent 
another similar crisis and to create safe and sound financial system.
9 It would probably (and just 
temporary) slow down creation of financial “novelties”, which are supposed to be “must have” in 
global race; from the other side, it would at least postpone if not prevent the next crisis. 
Judging by Keynes’ opinion – a fiscal policy could be more appropriate, but not any kind of such 
a policy. Proposed solutions directed to stimulate new cycle of investments via cutting of taxes 
were almost useless – most of them went to savings.
10 Great economists of our time completely 
                                                 
7 “Economic theory learns nothing from economic history, and economic history is as much corrupted as enriched 
by economic theory.” (Solow, 1985, p. 328) 
8 Precisely, treating financial institutions as the means to an end, and not the end itself, he had not believed in 
efficiency of such type of measures during heavy crisis. 
9 However, it should not be reduced only to modestly strengthen regulations insisting exclusively on transparency 
without significant, substantial changes which can prevent any future crisis. 
10 Exactly the same happened in the USA and Great Britain when such an idea occurred to neo-liberals.   Economic crisis, its prospects and challenges for economic theory 
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agree that global crisis demands global solutions – like coordinated fiscal policy; at the same 
time, they are skeptical about “feasibility” of such a policy since change of the course from neo-
liberalism to Keynesian-ism may not be revolutionary – i.e. those better prepared will not miss 
the opportunity to “use” the moment of crisis for their own purposes, which can be even more 
profitable for them than under market fundamentalism (Stiglitz, 2008; Krugman, 2009). 
From  the  point  of  view  of  economic  science,  moment  for  questioning  the  dominant 
neoclassic  paradigm  has  come.
11  Besides,  actual  crisis  will  probably  reaffirm  some  of  the 
unfairly repressed ideas. Therefore, in the conditions of exponentiation of economic regulations 
and  managing  which  relies  on  changing  rules  of  the  “game”,  we  can  expect  comeback  of 
Keynesian ideas as well as opening of additional “room” for conception of institutionalisms. 
What is the key word and common denominator of most of the explanations concerning the 
crisis? The right answer is: greed. That is why we would like to emphasize that the main point 
does not refer to complete discredit of well known philosophy that markets are self-correcting 
(Krugman,  2009; Stiglitz, 2008). “Pure” market economy (in Adam Smith’s sense of the word) 
takes  into  account  ethical  considerations  and  is  more  inclined  to  right  regulation  than  to 
deregulation. And what we nowadays practice is its distorted version, an “anarchic economy” 
(Lampe, 2008). In other words, a bundle of contradictions that arose and flourished within that 
system  are  more  responsible  for  crisis  than  neo-liberal  ideology  itself  (Panitch  and  Gindin, 
2008).
12 
In confrontation of different theoretical concepts, the best prospects for victory has the one that 
succeeds to incorporate in its theoretical model the parameters that describe the real economic 
system (in other words, the one that has the best “communication” with the economic reality). 
Why is it, in spite of the fact that the crisis are immanent in every economy, so hard for 
economic science to predict and eliminate them? Economic dynamic are consisted of two types 
of changes: a) cyclic (repeatable) and b) evolutionary ones (not repeatable). If the crisis can be 
characterized only by the cyclic kind of changes, it would be realistic to expect that economic 
science has learned something from previous experiences, so it can cope with them successfully. 
Far bigger “bite” is represented by evolutionary changes that make it impossible for economies 
to go back to the same position in which they were in the time of the previous cycle.
13 
Unfortunately, paradigms and economic theories that successfully prove their superiority, 
express the tendency towards conservation (i.e. they became somehow robust). On the other 
hand, real economic life is constantly changing, which broaden the gap between rigid theory and 
real economic system. Also, since the rules of the game are not questioned, they are  not in 
accordance with economic practice.
14 In that way we can spot and follow the cycle of paradigm 
and/or theories shifting. Two biggest economic crises that have shaken the world during the last 
century  were  characterized  by  the  following  features:  from  all  of  the  given  answers  to  the 
challenge of those crises, accepted was the one that represented the best possible solution for that 
given situation. 
                                                 
11 For more details about unchangeable and exclusive nature of this paradigm see: Hodgson, 2000. 
12 Panitch and Gindin distinguished neo-liberalism as “ideology” (meant to divorce market and state) from neo-
liberalism as “materially-driven form of social rule”.  Role of ideological component is now undermined; however, 
as a social rule calling for more regulation, it can be more dangerous. 
13 According to the principle of paedomorphosis (which has been known in biology), «evolution may, as it were, 
retrace its steps, to make a new start from an earlier point» (Hodgson, 2001, p. 345).  This principle can be aplicable 
to different «evolutions», even in economic science. 
14 Keeping in mind all of the complexness, dynamic and stochastic nature of economic system it is obvious that 
market “game“ can not count on stable and long term rules.  Slavica Manic 
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Of  course,  as  the  time  passed  by,  the  “right  answer”  looses  its  pragmatism.  That  is  why 
previously  perspective  theoretical  concept  is  no  longer  capable  to  communicate  with  newly 
created changes in real economic system; this is an intro to new crisis. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Concerning short-term policy responses, it seems that economists almost exhausted ideas 
they have at the disposal. Also, they explained and described in details rise, developing and 
culmination of the crisis. Yes, they noticed one by one almost every symptom which emerged in 
the  meantime. They realized that we have  many sick  “persons” (number of which  has  been 
increasing), suffering from common as well as diverse “pains” at the same time. Surely, they 
were aware of the possibility that “illness” was becoming epidemic by nature and huge by its 
dimension.  
What they did not do? They certainly cured the above-mentioned symptoms in the order of 
appearance, being no capable either to determine what really was wrong or how to make right 
diagnosis  and  prescribe  the  remedy.  Although  pointing  at  many  imperfections  of  capitalist 
system in general, their critiques were not that constructive. Precisely, they offered neither vision 
of  alternative  system  nor  strategy  how  that  more  egalitarian  (yet  imaginary)  system  can  be 
established. 
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